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AND THE SEARCH FOR HAPPINESS
Nathan Thompson
“It is a hundred times easier to be happy than to 
appear to be happy.”
-Jean Jacques Rousseau
“Of course I’m miserable, but were I not miserable, 
I wouldn’t be at Yale.”
-William Deresiewicz
A double major, a sport, a musical instrument, a couple of 
foreign languages, service work in distant corners of the globe, 
and, of course, a few hobbies thrown in for good measure, each 
mastered with effortlessness and a serene self-assurance. This is 
the stuff of 21st-century super-achievers, those students at elite 
schools who appear cheerfully competent at everything. If that 
sounds anything like you, your friends, or what you aspire to 
be, this paper is for you. If the names Deerfield, Williams, 
Harvard, or Stanford mean anything to you, this paper is for 
you. Most importantly, if you’re tired of running laps on the 
well-worn treadmill of success, this paper is for you.
In his Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of the American 
Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life, William Deresiewicz 
unapologetically exposes the aspirations and deep-rooted 
anxieties of the “best and brightest” filing into the top universi-
ties in the United States. He introduces the reader to the 
formidable combination of brains, ambition, and fear of failure 
residing in many young people and their families. These 
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students’ capacity to consume, analyze, and regurgitate 
information is breathtaking, be it every member of a class 
memorizing and reciting 100 lines of Shakespeare without a 
single error or a high school student conducting cancer re-
search. Assign them a school task, and it will be completed 
with ruthless efficiency. Every “i” will be dotted. Every “t” will 
be crossed. Curiously, however, closer examination reveals so 
many similarities between these high achievers that their 
individual identities appear stripped away. One might even go 
so far as to call them sheep. Of course, they are not average 
sheep—they roam around together, eating AP courses for 
breakfast, spending summers working prestigious internships, 
and traveling the world for cultural enrichment. They are 
excellent.
These kinds of students, however, are no longer simply the 
product of the meritocracy for which America is famed. They 
do not come from just anywhere, nor do they embody time-
honored American examples of how hard work, long hours, and 
a little bit of luck can take children of poverty and turn them 
into something exceptional. Quite the opposite. In the clear, 
compelling, and frightening three hundred pages of his Coming 
Apart: The State of White America 1960-2010, Charles Murray 
demonstrates that, for the first time, America is seeing both the 
drawing and hardening of class lines: a real upper class, a real 
lower class, and everyone in the middle moving in one direc-
tion or the other.1 However, this divergence is not only a 
monetary one. It is also one of values, habits, education, and 
geographic location—and make no mistake: while a few 
stragglers are welcomed into the fold, Deresiewicz’s sheep are 
the children of this new upper class.
These excellent sheep, populating the Ivies (or their neigh-
bors who rank highly in U.S. News and World Report) and 
prestigious financial and consulting institutions after gradua-
tion, are the product of several important inputs: top-flight 
1 Charles Murray, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 
1960-2010 (New York: Crown Forum, 2012), 23-126.
Nathan Thompson
95
education, high family income, stability at home, parents with 
advanced degrees, and geographic isolation from those not 
sharing similar characteristics. Together, these factors have 
begun limiting the capacity of traditional American meritocracy 
to generate social and economic mobility. These students are 
exceptionally competent, analytical, intelligent, and hard-
working, but it would be dishonest to say that their smarts are 
the sole cause of their material success in life. Success nowa-
days is primarily, if not exclusively, the result of a system. It is 
a system caught somewhere between being hereditary and 
meritocratic—generally speaking, circumstances of birth are 
important but may not be enough to succeed anymore without 
the brains to match and vice versa—and its products are 
peerless. It is a system Deresiewicz describes as the laundering 
of privilege.2
Despite this system’s effectiveness, the excellence it pro-
duces comes at costs much greater than a few missed parties 
and a handful of all-nighters. These costs are perhaps known 
and felt in the deepest corners of the heart and mind but go 
otherwise unarticulated: insecurity, fear of failure, a deep-
rooted unhappiness, and the atrophy of the soul. Recognizing 
such costs might reasonably lead one to challenge and look for
alternatives to an excellent sheep’s notion of success, and 
because these potential costs are too great to ignore, the 
remainder of the paper will attempt to give them proper 
attention.  
In order to understand these creatures of success, it is first 
necessary to explore the origin of their excellence. As 
Deresiewicz and others observe, one does not have to look long 
or far to see what creates this crop of high achievers. It begins 
in the home, where a suffocating amount of pressure is applied 
to achieve success from a young age. It does not even have to 
be intentional. But as Deresiewicz writes, the business of 
2 William Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep: The Miseducation of 
the American Elite and the Way to a Meaningful Life (New York: 
Free Press, 2014), 211.
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“determining the exact hierarchy of status within the upper 
middle class itself” is a serious one, and most, if not all, of a 
family’s resources tend to be directed towards building the 
pressure cooker that will spit out diamonds bearing Ivy League 
credentials.3
The lesson is learned from an early age that in life “there is 
no middle ground; if you’re not the best, you’re a ‘loser.’ If 
you’re not brilliant, you’re worthless.”4 Students may find 
themselves identifying with the pressures that Deresiewicz 
claims converge at home: “status competition within extended 
families; peer pressure within communities; the desire to 
measure up to your own parents, or to best them.”5 The list of 
achievements attained by kids trying to relieve those pressures 
include the usual suspects of a perfect GPA, president of a club, 
captain of a team, or first chair in the orchestra, but in the end, 
each is simply a tool with which to measure outperforming 
one’s peers. 
As one might imagine, family relationships based on the 
expectation of a child excelling above and beyond his or her 
peers, even if unspoken, easily become conditional. Dere-
siewicz writes that what is “expected by many parents in 
affluent communities is not a personal best but the absolute 
best,” so even if all little Johnny can manage in his 10th grade 
English class is a B+, that will not cut it at home.6 Ultimately, 
the “production of measurable virtue in children” is the goal 
towards which Mom and Dad direct life. As Deresiewicz aptly 
notes, though, measureable here means “capable of showing up 
on a college application.”7 Spending time “hanging out” or 
hiking local trails on the weekend are not items that frequent 
most resumes; learning a second language or tutoring under-
resourced kids are. 




7 Ibid., 50. 
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Given the enormous expectations faced by students to be 
the very best, it is no wonder that their identities are found in 
“measurable” achievement. However, such identity is not only 
given to Deresiewicz’s sheep. They also consume, perpetuate, 
and preach it. The currency of this identity is Ivy League 
acceptances, perfect SAT scores, and Instagram photos from 
exotic trips. These are the symbols of status and accomplish-
ment one can quietly slip into conversation with just enough of 
an “aw, shucks” attitude to draw the verbal affirmation of one’s 
peers while, one hopes, also making them jealous. 
A deep, addictive satisfaction comes from such recogni-
tion. If one possesses enough of this currency, one becomes 
entitled to his or her peers’ praise. And these excellent sheep 
will do just about anything to strike it rich—or avoid coming up 
empty. The purpose of life “becomes the accumulation of gold 
stars,” and what constitutes a valid life becomes “affluence, 
credentials, and prestige” rather than pursuing one’s passions.8
Professions that do not ultimately land six-figure salaries and 
luxurious homes are not worth our time. Credentials that are not 
instantaneously recognizable are without value. The pursuit of 
meaning beyond a strong resume is nonsensical. Deresiewicz 
imagines those deep-seated concerns with failure in the form of 
a series of potent questions:
How can I become a teacher, or a minister, or a carpen-
ter? Wouldn’t that be a waste of my fancy education? 
What would my parents think? What would my friends 
think? How would I face my classmates at our twentieth 
reunion, when they’re all rich doctors or important peo-
ple in New York? And the question that exists behind 
them all: isn’t it beneath me?9
These questions strike at the heart of the matter: everyone 
is afraid of failing in front of parents and peers, showing any 





non-profit worker because neither McKinsey nor Bain nor 
Goldman ever came calling. As a result, one must be able to do 
everything and do everything well. The cost of falling short in 
this respect becomes “not merely practical, but existential.”10
To not ultimately land at an Ivy League or one of its neighbors 
on the way to a successful career in finance, consulting, law, or 
medicine is the same as being worthless. And so we develop all 
the necessary abilities for this kind of life—not how to think 
but rather those “analytical and rhetorical skills that are
necessary for success in business and the professions.”11
Ross Douthat memorably relates from his four years at 
Harvard how he was taught to get away with doing as little as 
possible. For him it was hard work to “get into Harvard,” to 
compete for “offices and honors with thousands of brilliant and 
driven young people,” and to fight for “law school slots and I-
banking jobs as college wound to a close.”12 The academics, 
though, were not hard work. They were “the easy part.”13 As a 
result, it was a rare sheep indeed that invested more time in true 
learning than in making connections or crafting the perfect 
resume. Deresiewicz is no kinder, suggesting that what “Ivy 
League-caliber schools like Yale or Columbia teach their 
students is how to pretend, and how to do it well.”14 Ultimately, 
we build an identity around accomplishments that can pad a 
resume, and we hope those resumes are strong enough to shore 
up our self-esteem in the event of a calamitous development 
such as criticism or failure. 
Interestingly, the question why? is rarely asked—why it 
matters so much that our SAT scores clear 1500 instead of 
1400, why our BA must come from Princeton instead of 
Rutgers, or why our first job has to be with J.P Morgan instead 
10 Ibid., 22.
11 Ibid., 63.
12 Ross Douthat, Privilege: Harvard the Education of the Rul-
ing Class (New York: Hyperion, 2005), 140.
13 Ibid., 140. 
14 Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep, 104.
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of a non-profit. Dwight Macdonald once remarked upon the 
great curiosity that “we think it odd that a man should devote 
his life to writing poems . . . but natural that he should devote it 
to inducing children to breakfast on Crunchies instead of 
Krispies.”15 There is a depressing humor in Macdonald’s
observation, for who on the path to hard-earned success would 
not recognize a well-paid marketing position with Kellogg as a 
post more enviable than that of a high school English teacher? 
Furthermore, there is a premise underlying this notion of 
success that is similarly left in the shadows: that “what makes 
for a happy life and a good society [is] simply self-evident, . . . 
as if in either case the exclusive answer [is] more money.”16 It 
is a premise, though, that is accepted by a majority of students. 
In 1971, only 37% of incoming college freshmen said it was 
essential or very important to be “very well-off financially”
compared to 73% who said it was similarly important to 
“develop a meaningful philosophy of life.”17 In 2011, “the 
numbers were almost reversed,” with 80% believing that being 
very well off is essential versus only 47% emphasizing the 
importance of developing a meaningful philosophy of life.18
However, even those who achieve their goal of success, as 
has already been noted, do not do so without cost. In fact, there 
is a great deal of research and anecdotal evidence pointing to a 
deep-seated unhappiness within the hearts and minds of the 
high achievers among us. Deresiewicz writes that preteens and 
teens from affluent and well-educated families experience 
“among the highest rates of depression, substance abuse, 
anxiety disorders, somatic complaints, and unhappiness of any 
group of children” in the United States, with “as many as 22 
percent of adolescent girls from financially comfortable 








The disastrous effects of the pressure placed on teens in 
upper-middle class homes is heartbreakingly documented by 
Madeline Levine in her New York Times Bestseller, The Price 
of Privilege. Her stories are similar and numerous, covering a 
host of problems from drug abuse to binge drinking to anxiety 
and depression to anorexia. Levine writes that “as many as 30 
to 40 percent of twelve- to eighteen-year olds from affluent 
homes are experiencing troubling psychological symptoms,”
which do nothing to lower the frequency of harmful behaviors 
and the intensity of the pressure to succeed that is felt.20 The 
backdrop to each of her stories of young men and women 
abusing drugs and alcohol, cutting, contemplating suicide, and 
reporting remarkable unhappiness is almost universally a 
combination of a crushing pressure to succeed, a crippling fear 
of failure, and a misguided belief that pressing on might 
somehow lead to happiness. These are the stories of excellent 
sheep, and they are a wakeup call to those of us who either 
tacitly or expressly endorse an environment of high-pressure 
perfectionism. 
When coupled with a deep unhappiness, this constant pur-
suit of “success” is exhausting. And yet, we continue to trap 
ourselves in this vicious cycle. The pursuit of status, success, 
and high achievement at the cost of sleep, relationships, true 
learning, and even happiness becomes a race with no finish 
line. So why do we keep running? Simply stated, we are slaves 
to the opinions of others. Students are “trained to depend” upon
the “drug of praise.”21 We become presidents of clubs, captains 
of teams, and students with perfect GPAs and SAT scores not 
because we genuinely enjoy them but because those are the 
things that ensure we will receive the most praise. These 
symbols of achievement “signify not just your fate, but your 
20 Madeline Levine, The Price of Privilege: How Parental 
Pressure and Material Advantage Are Creating a Generation of 
Disconnected and Unhappy Kids (New York: Harper, 2006), 19.
21 Deresiewicz, Excellent Sheep, 51.
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identity; not just your identity, but your value. They are who 
you are, and what you’re worth.”22
Self-worth becomes comparative in nature. If we don’t 
score as well as other students on standardized tests, attend the 
same elite schools as our peers, or land the same prestigious 
jobs after graduation, we must suffer the low opinion of our 
parents, our friends, and our professors—an unacceptable 
prospect. The problem with self-worth based on a relative 
sentiment like opinion is that it engenders a severe internal 
uncertainty and instability. Under such circumstances, there can 
be little confidence of place or of one’s own value as an 
individual. In turn, such uncertainty demands the herculean 
efforts exhibited by those excellent sheep climbing ever higher 
on the ladder of success. 
Unfortunately for those sheep, though, there is no rooftop 
to reach, so the climbing never ends. When chasing after status 
and the high regard of others, one finds very quickly that 
“status doesn’t get you much except the knowledge that you 
have it.” Given its endless nature, this pursuit “doesn’t just not 
make you happy: it makes you actively unhappy” precisely 
because it is “comparative, and competitive, by its very nature.”
Deresiewicz shares the sorry experience of those students who 
get to places like Yale thinking they’ve arrived, “only to 
discover that there are still other places to arrive at” and that 
there always will be. Clearly, contentment and the pursuit of 
status do not mix.23
It should come as no surprise that a life spent running a 
race that has no finish line would be both exhausting and 
deeply unsatisfying, yet it would appear that many of us remain 
committed to the enterprise of chasing down success. This 
commitment is inextricably linked to a conception of self-love 
that is comparative. Our worth is bolstered when we compare 
ourselves to others and find that we are achieving just as much 





better yet, higher GPAs than our fellow students, or that we got 
the internship commensurate to our elite education. 
This is a picture that many of us might recognize within 
ourselves. It is this kind of self love—a relative, comparative, 
and dangerous sentiment—that deserves further exploration, for 
to comprehend our unwavering commitments to success and 
status first requires an understanding of our own yardstick of 
self-worth. The comparative nature of our self-love is not 
unique to 21st-century high-achievers; it has long been the 
companion of humankind. Because this is the case, wisdom 
would demand that we examine what those who came before us 
have thought and written about our tendency to compare. 
When one explores the works of the world’s great thinkers, 
it does not take long to realize that many have identified and 
analyzed this very issue. Of all those who have written about it, 
though, there is one that stands out. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, an 
18th-century political philosopher, presents an articulation and 
analysis of amour-propre, or vanity—our tendency to value 
ourselves based on how we compare to those around us—that is 
unrivaled in its clarity, frankness, and forcefulness of argument. 
To read Rousseau is to view the human soul with an X-ray. 
He exposes, as only he can, the many masks of benevolence, 
humility, and selflessness we wear to cover the ambition, ill 
will towards others, and selfishness we harbor. However, what 
makes Rousseau’s analysis of the problem of comparative self-
love the best of its kind (and so helpful for our excellent sheep) 
is that he traces its development from cradle to full-fledged 
adulthood. According to Rousseau, we are not born as hateful, 
vain, or callous individuals but rather as people who learn to be 
just so. To more fully understand the quandary of Dere-
siewicz’s excellent sheep, joining Rousseau at man’s beginning 
is a helpful place to start, before tracing the progression to the 
final product—namely, an individual who bases his or her value 
on the opinions and judgments of others. 
For Rousseau, natural man begins as a blank slate, re-
moved from any and all “artificial faculties he could only have 
acquired by prolonged progress,” such as language, tools, 
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buildings, or farming.24 In this state, Rousseau finds a man 
“sating his hunger beneath an oak, slaking his thirst at the first 
stream, finding his bed at the foot of the same tree that supplied 
his meal, and with that his needs are satisfied.”25 This is a 
person in simplest form, needing nothing more than food, 
water, and shelter. When deprived of every sort of enlighten-
ment, the only goods known to natural man are “food, a female, 
and rest,” and natural man does not even possess the 
“knowledge of death and its terrors.”26 In fact, so blind is 
natural man to anything past the present that “his projects, as 
limited as his views, hardly extend to the close of day.”27
Part of the utter simplicity of natural man is tied to a desire 
for self-preservation. Rousseau writes that man’s “first care”
was “that for his preservation,” a driving force that leads a 
person to seek only the most basic needs.28 This kind of desire 
is described by Rousseau as “self-love—a primitive, innate 
passion, which is anterior to every other.”29 It is not hateful or 
desiring of the approval of others. To Rousseau, “self-love, 
which regards only ourselves, is contented when our true needs 
are satisfied.”30
However, the trouble begins when we leave a solitary life 
and interact with other human beings. By virtue of seeing 
another person, one observes the differences that exist between 
one’s self and the other. In fact, Rousseau argues that the very 
act of thinking—something unique to the human race—requires 
24 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, “Discourse on the Origin and Foun-
dations of Inequality Among Men or Second Discourse,” in 
Rousseau: The Discourses and Other Early Political Writings, ed. 










that we make distinctions and identify what makes each object 
and person unique. For instance, Rousseau challenges his 
reader to try and outline the image of a tree without specifics 
but goes on to argue that such a task is impossible. He writes 
that “in spite of yourself, [the tree] will have to be seen as small 
or large, bare or leafy, light or dark . . . you cannot help making 
its lines perceptible or its surface colored.”31 It is impossible to 
see things generally—we view the world in specifics. Ultimate-
ly, thinking amounts to distinguishing between various objects 
and ideas, so when one person comes in contact with another, 
specific comparison is inevitable.
As Rousseau states, “The first glance [man] casts on his 
fellows leads him to compare himself with them.”32 Even if no 
malevolence is intended, we gauge who is taller, who is faster, 
or who is stronger. Rousseau notes that “the relations which we 
express by the words great, small, strong, weak, fast, slow, 
fearful, bold, and other such ideas, compared as need required 
and almost without thinking about it, finally produced in him 
some sort of reflection, or rather a mechanical prudence that 
suggested to him the precautions most necessary for his 
safety.”33
It is not long, though, before elementary comparisons de-
velop into a habit of comparing more than height, speed, or 
strength. Rousseau notes that while man was “scarcely able to 
discriminate ranks, . . . he was from afar preparing to claim first 
rank as an individual.”34 From this first point of comparison, 
the long fall from innocence begins. Rousseau’s description is 
worth quoting at length:
Everyone began to look at everyone else and to wish to 
be looked at himself, and public esteem acquired a price. 







strongest, the most skillful, or the most eloquent came to 
be the most highly regarded, and this was the first step 
at once toward inequality and vice: from these first pref-
erences arose vanity and contempt on the one hand, 
shame and envy on the other; and the fermentation 
caused by these new leavens eventually produced com-
pounds fatal to happiness and innocence.35
Thus is born amour-propre, or vanity. It is “a relative sen-
timent, factitious, and born in society, which inclines every 
individual to set greater store by himself than by anyone 
else.”36 Not only that, it also “demands others to prefer us to 
themselves, which is impossible.”37 For Rousseau, it is inescap-
able. It is not just that we became vain and envious, though. 
Amour-propre, a sentiment of vanity and comparison, has a 
distinct character, one of “consuming ambition” that “instills in 
all men a black inclination to harm one another, a secret 
jealousy that is all the more dangerous as it often assumes the 
mask of benevolence in order to strike its blow in greater 
safety.”38
Rousseau’s analysis clearly identifies what the mental pro-
cesses behind amour-propre actually are. After all, how often 
do we wear masks of benevolence in order to ensure that we are 
ultimately viewed as better than our peers? How often do we 
feign humility or generosity or kindness simply for the sake of 
being thought of as humble, generous, or kind?  How many 
times have we cared far more about how others viewed us than 
about the morality or character of our actions? Not as immedi-
ately clear, though, are the consequences of this kind of self-
love, and this is where Rousseau’s articulation of the deepest 
impact of amour-propre is so compelling. 
35 Ibid., 166.
36 Ibid., 218.
37 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Emile or On Education, trans. Alan 
Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1979), 214.
38 Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” 171.
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The nature of amour-propre is such that it takes an indi-
vidual content with a simple life and teaches him or her to 
depend upon the opinion of others for value and meaning. The 
effect is one of deep unhappiness because a self-love based 
upon comparisons made with others is never assured of stability 
or fulfillment. In other words, we can always find something 
with which to compare ourselves and in which to find ourselves 
lacking. 
Rousseau relates the story of a young man, who, seeing 
another young man “better dressed than himself,” secretly 
complains “about his parents’ avarice.”39 However, if this same 
young man finds himself “more adorned than another,” he is 
“pained to see this other outshine him by birth or wit, and to see 
all his gilding humiliated in the presence of a simple cloth 
suit.”40 If nothing else, Rousseau teaches us that there are 
innumerable ways to find one’s self inferior to others and that 
this leads to a profound unhappiness. Much like the young 
people Deresiewicz and Levine describe as suffering from 
tremendous pressure to succeed (and the resulting assortment of 
consequences), Rousseau’s young man is an example of the 
deep insecurity and unhappiness resulting from dependence on 
a feeling of relative success among one’s peers.  
Of course, there is an assumption necessarily made preced-
ing an individual’s dependence on his or her standing in the 
eyes of others, which is that status, praise, and money are 
actually valuable in and of themselves. Rousseau writes that “in 
order to see the purpose of so many cares . . . power and 
reputation would have to have some sort of meaning in [a 
man’s] mind.” There is a critical lesson learned, namely that 
“there is a sort of men who count how they are looked upon by 
the rest of the universe for something, who can be happy and 
satisfied with themselves on the testimony of others rather than 
on their own.”41





There is much of ourselves to be recognized in these 18th-
century writings—a frantic habit of comparison, of looking in 
the mirror to ensure everything appears just right, of assigning 
great weight to unquantifiable concepts of status or reputa-
tion—and Rousseau forcefully accounts for how we arrive at 
such a position. From that first glance at another human being 
right up to the birth of that dark inclination to see harm done to 
those around us, the path is well worn. But if in fact the 
tendency to compare to others to the point of exhaustion and 
unhappiness is not just a tendency but also an intractable 
plague, is there anything to be done? 
Reading Rousseau’s assessment of our character is both a 
powerful and—if one takes his claims about human nature 
seriously—disconcerting experience.  His analysis unceremoni-
ously strips away our masks of benevolence and sincerity, 
revealing the jealousy, unsympathizing ambition, and paralyz-
ing fear that we seek to hide. But does it do us any good only to 
know that day in and day out, we ask others to value us above 
themselves? That the recognition and status we inevitably 
pursue only makes us vain and insecure people? That the 
moment we meet others, we begin making comparisons that can 
only end in enmity? While recognizing a problem can be a 
helpful step, to end on such a note given the reality of amour-
propre does little to address Rousseau’s predicament or offer 
solace to Deresiewicz’s sheep. Thus, an exploration of 
Rousseau’s conception of a life without amour-propre—a life 
of true happiness—becomes necessary.
Rousseau claims that “it is a hundred times easier to be 
happy than to appear to be happy,” and this serves as an 
outstanding introduction to his notion of happiness.42 This 
thought demands that we ask ourselves a question, and it is one 
that Deresiewicz is quick to point out that many high achieving 
college students either do not know or are too afraid to ask. 
This question, surprising as it may be, is not “what will make 




money in life?” Instead the question is “what makes me 
happy?” As much of a cliché as it is, this remains an important 
question for a society that so readily surrenders its happiness 
and self-worth to the opinions of other people. Rousseau’s 
insight calls for reflection on what we are doing to appear 
happy to others and what we might change so that we are 
actually happy. 
Rousseau’s answer to this question, perhaps not surprising-
ly, has little to do with obtaining an Ivy League degree, 
working for a prestigious consulting firm, or owning a nice 
house. In fact, it begins with simplicity, a virtue with which 
many at the top of the food chain may be unfamiliar. This 
becomes clear in a number of his writings, particularly his 
“Second Discourse,” “Book IV” of Emile, and his Reveries of 
the Solitary Walker. Rousseau describes the experience of a 
wealthy man who owns a palace but finds no use for all the 
rooms because he cannot occupy each one. In the end, it 
becomes a gilded cage, promising luxury but delivering an 
experience of imprisonment.43 The great flaw of amour-
propre’s relative nature is that it spurs the accumulation of 
excess (money, clothes, land, titles, reputation), which only 
gives people more and more ways to compare what they do or 
do not possess. As Rousseau writes, “Sociable man, always 
outside himself, is capable of living only in the opinion of 
others and, so to speak, derives the sentiment of his own 
existence solely from their judgment.”44 To Rousseau, the first 
and proper response to the comparative tendencies of amour-
propre is to make an effort to return to simplicity. 
An example of what this kind of simplicity looks like for 
Rousseau is captured in his Fifth Walk of the Solitary Walker, 
during which he describes his days spent on a nearly deserted 
island in the middle of a Swiss lake. This sort of abandonment 
of society may strike the modern observer as decidedly odd. 
After all, Rousseau does not have an iPhone or laptop on his 
43 Ibid., 347.
44 Rousseau, “Second Discourse,” 187.
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person, so there will be no way to share with others what he 
sees; he has only his memory to capture everything around him. 
The scene before Rousseau is one where “there is more natural 
greenery, more meadows, grove-shaded retreats, more frequent 
contrasts, and more variety in the terrain” than on the main-
land.45 Life on the island forbids “any kind of communication 
with the mainland so that being unaware of all that went on in 
the world I might forget its existence and that it might also 
forget mine.”46 On Rousseau’s island, no filtered (or #nofilter) 
Instagram posts reach the rest of society. No Facebook statuses 
describing the “incredible” or “awesome” or “breathtaking”
sights of this island reach the newsfeeds of others, and none of 
their communications reach Rousseau. Pleasure is taken from 
nothing other than a short walk. Hours are spent observing the 
beauty of a single flower. Reward is drawn from an afternoon 
paddling around the lake. 
Another aspect of this simplicity is its decided lack of ori-
entation towards a set of tasks or goals. Rousseau’s days are 
spent “without having any well-determined or constant object,”
a concept that also might fail to compute for a 21st-century 
achiever.47 Somehow, though, this kind of simplicity is what 
brings Rousseau the most happiness, and he calls these aimless 
days “a hundred times preferable to the sweetest things I had 
found in what are called the pleasures of life.”48
Simplicity is only the beginning of happiness for        
Rousseau, though, because the value of a simple life rests on 
the bedrock of a more important idea, that true contentment is 
found in the sentiment of one’s existence—that the fact of 
being alive is enough for one to always be satisfied with life. 
One may argue that it is impossible to live a contented and 
45 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Reveries of the Solitary Walker,
in The Collected Writings of Rousseau, ed. Christopher Kelly 






fulfilled life by merely appreciating one’s existence, but 
Rousseau makes a compelling case that demands a serious
response. 
In his Reveries of the Solitary Walker, Rousseau describes 
the experience of awakening to how unnecessarily he was 
weighed down by the opinions of others. He first believed 
others viewed him as “the horror of the human race,” observing 
that “the only greeting passersby would give [him] would be to 
spit” on him.49 This caused great agitation, indignation, and a 
tendency to struggle “without cleverness, without craft . . . 
without prudence.”50 However, after realizing that such inner-
conflict only ever resulted in an endless struggle over what 
cannot be controlled (the opinions of others), he took the only 
remaining course, namely “submitting to [his] fate without 
railing against necessity any longer.”51 Rousseau recognized 
how much stock he set by the expectations and opinions of 
others and, understanding he could not control either one, 
finally decided to refrain from assigning them value. No longer 
chained to what others think or say about him, Rousseau is able 
to find ultimate meaning and value in his own life. 
For Rousseau, the sentiment of existence possesses beauty 
and mystery. In his Fifth Walk, he says it is a sentiment 
“stripped of any other emotion, is in itself a precious sentiment 
of contentment and of peace which alone would suffice to make 
this existence dear and sweet to anyone able to spurn all the 
sensual and earthly impressions which incessantly come to 
distract us from it and to trouble its sweetness here-below.”52
The appeal of the argument for a happiness not derived from 
earthly pleasures and the comparisons it leads us to make is that 
it is dependent on no person other than one’s self. It is not by 
God’s help that we become truly content. It is not by the help of 







when we are content in our own environment and with our own 
existence; by remaining in this state, “we are sufficient unto 
ourselves.”53
One can contest Rousseau’s claim of the ultimate source of 
this contentment, but his articulation of the truest expression of 
happiness is compelling for two reasons. First, it speaks to a 
longing for freedom from the social upkeep to which many feel 
chained, and second, there is a profound appeal found in a life 
committed to simplicity. In the end, Rousseau’s solution for a 
vain and comparing people is to attack the problem of amour-
propre at its source: the more simply we live, the fewer points 
of reference we have with which to compare. Stated most 
succinctly, Rousseau’s conception of happiness is a simple life 
drawn from the deeper well of our own self-sufficiency and 
contentment with existence. 
One may observe that no excellent sheep is an island, but 
even still, a serious reading of Rousseau’s assessment of 
amour-propre and his solution to the problem demands sober 
reflection on our habit of comparison to others and what might 
be done about it. To Rousseau, amour-propre is deeply 
entrenched. Worse still for us, we are unable to retreat from 
society in quite the same way Rousseau does in his Reveries.
Nevertheless, we can still ask the questions of ourselves that his 
analysis raises—what do we do because we enjoy the praise it 
earns us? What do we do for fear of not measuring up if we do 
not? What do we refuse to do for fear of failure? How often do 
we find ourselves quite literally looking at another person and 
considering the ways in which we think he or she is better or 
worse than us? 
These are questions that, if asked seriously, should illumi-
nate the places where we are most enslaved to the opinions of 
others; as such, asking these questions can be a risk, for to 
examine the parts of ourselves that are dependent on others is to 
acknowledge vulnerabilities we may wish to remain unexposed. 




answers to the questions of why we burn the midnight oil, join 
ten clubs, and cast every part of life in terms of success or 
failure is, in my estimation, the first step towards freedom from 
the opinion of others.
Deresiewicz and Rousseau both articulate the pervasive 
problem of a life spent worrying about what others think of 
you. For them, such a life is an exercise in exhaustion and 
unhappiness. It is a treadmill of accomplishments, empty 
accolades, stress, and, most importantly, constant comparison, 
and it leaves those stuck running on it with no purpose other 
than to keep from falling off. Rousseau offers a solution to this 
problem, and it is one of radical contentment with the simple 
fact of one’s own existence. One may find such an existence to 
be deeply unsatisfying or impractical. However, by proposing 
such a remedy, Rousseau moves the conversation forward, and 
in doing so, he raises the question that any excellent sheep 
should be keen to address: if a life spent on the treadmill of 
success leads to unhappiness, how do we step off?
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